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WILLS, TRUSTS, AND ESTATES
J. Rodney Johnson*
The 1990 session of the General Assembly enacted legislation
dealing with wills, trusts, and estates that added, amended, or re-
pealed a number of sections of the Code of Virginia (the "Code").
In addition to this legislation, there were fifteen cases from the Su-
preme Court of Virginia, in the year ending June 1, 1990, which
involved issues of interest to both the general practitioner and the
specialist in wills, trusts, and estates. This article analyzes each of
these legislative and judicial developments.'
I. 1990 LEGISLATION
A. Dower and Curtesy Repealed-Augmented Estate
Effective January 1, 1991, the interests of dower and curtesy are
abolished and a surviving spouse will acquire new elective rights,
based upon the augmented estate concept found in the Uniform
Probate Code,2 in both the real and personal estate of the deceased
spouse.' This new legislation is discussed at length elsewhere in
this annual survey.4
B. Statutory Rights Barred by Desertion
Section 64.1-23 of the Code has provided that the penalty for
willfully deserting or abandoning a spouse is forfeiture of all rights
* Professor of Law, T. C. Williams School of Law, University of Richmond; B.A., 1965,
College of William and Mary; J.D., 1967, Marshall-Wythe School of Law, College of William
and Mary; LL.M., 1970, New York University.
1. In order to facilitate the discussion of numerous Code of Virginia sections, they will be
generally referred to in the text by their section numbers only. Unless otherwise stated,
those section numbers will refer to the latest printing of the old sections and to the 1990
supplement for the new sections.
2. UNIF. PROB. CODE §§ 2-201 to -207, 8 U.L.A. 74-87 (Repl. Vol. 1983).
3. VA. CODE ANN. § 64.1-19.2 (Cum. Supp. 1990).
4. See, Gray, Virginia's Augmented Estate System: Annual Survey of Virginia Law, 24
U. RIcH. L. REv. 513 (1990). For background, see Johnson, Abolition of Dower in Virginia:
The Uniform Probate Code as an Alternative to Proposed Legislation, 7 U. RICH. L. REv. 99
(1972); and Johnson, Interspousal Property Rights at Death, 10 VA. B.A.J. 10 (Summer
1984).
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in such spouse's estate by way of dower, curtesy or intestate suc-
cession, if the desertion or abandonment continues until the
spouse's death.' This section was repealed as a part of the "aug-
mented estate legislation,"6 and replaced with a new section7
which, under these same circumstances, (i) continues to provide for
a forfeiture of intestate succession rights, (ii) provides for a forfei-
ture of one's elective share under the new concept of the aug-
mented estate, and (iii) extends this forfeiture provision to the de-
serting spouse's interest by way of exempt property," family
allowance, 9 and homestead allowance. 10
C. Homestead Allowance-Increase
A further provision of the "augmented estate legislation,"" ef-
fective January 1, 1991, is the increase of the homestead exemption
from its present amount of $5,00012 to $10,000.1
D. Waiver-Homestead, Exempt Property and Family
Allowances
Another provision of the "augmented estate legislation"' 4 pro-
vides that the right to the family and exempt articles allowances
may be waived during the deceased spouse's lifetime only by a pre-
marital or marital agreement. However, the right to a homestead
exemption may be waived during the deceased spouses's lifetime
either (a) in this same way or (b) by the execution of a waiver to a
creditor if, in this latter case, "(i) the waiver is in writing, (ii) the
language of the waiver mentions homestead allowance in conspicu-
ous language, and (iii) the waiver has been signed by the surviving
spouse."' 5
5. VA. CODE ANN. § 64.1-23 (Repl. Vol. 1987).
6. 1990 Va. Acts 1354.
7. VA. CODE ANN. § 64.1-16.3 (Cum. Supp. 1990) (effective Jan. 1, 1991).
8. This is a right to "value not exceeding $3,500 in ... household furniture, automobiles,
furnishings, appliances and personal effects." Id. § 64.1-151.2 (Repl. Vol. 1987).
9. This is a right to "a reasonable allowance in money out of the estate for ... mainte-
nance during the period of administration." Id. § 64.1-151.1.
10. This has been a right to an allowance in the amount of $5,000. Id. § 64.1-151.3. This
amount will increase to $10,000, effective January 1, 1991. Id. (Cum. Supp. 1990).
11. 1990 Va. Acts 1354.
12. VA. CODE ANN. § 64.1-151.3 (Rep. Vol. 1987).
13. Id. (Cum. Supp. 1990).
14. 1990 Va. Acts 1354.
15. VA. CODE ANN. § 64.1-151.6 (Cum. Supp. 1990).
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E. Uniform Custodial Trust Act
In 1987, the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform
State Laws approved and recommended the Uniform Custodial
Trust Act ("UCTA") for enactment in all jurisdictions. 6 With Vir-
ginia's enactment in 1990,11 a total of five jurisdictions have now
enacted this legislation."8 UCTA "is designed to provide a statu-
tory standby inter vivos trust for individuals who typically are not
very affluent or sophisticated."' 9 Though UCTA's potential as a
trust substitute is extensive, its drafters anticipate it will be most
frequently used as a "response to the commonly occurring need of
elderly individuals to provide for the future management of assets
in the event of incapacity."2
Although a detailed examination of UCTA is not feasible within
the confines of this survey article,2' it may be helpful to the reader
to point out the changes made to the Act in Virginia. The Virginia
version of UCTA appears as chapter 2.1 of title 55 of the Code
(section 55-34.1 through section 55-34.19). The portion of the Vir-
ginia section number following the decimal point corresponds to
the section number of UCTA (for example, section 55-34.4 corre-
sponds to Section 4 of UCTA). The Virginia version generally
tracks the recommended language, mutatis mutandis, with only
six changes that might be regarded as significant. The Virginia
changes to UCTA are:
1. Section 2, subsections (d) and (e) are combined and rewritten
(as section 55-34.2(D)) to read as follows:
The beneficiary, if not incapacitated, may terminate a custodial
trust by delivering to the custodial trustee a writing signed by the
beneficiary declaring the termination. The conservator of an inca-
16. UNIF. CUSTODIAL TRUST AcT historical note, 7A U.L.A. 6 (Cum. Supp. 1990).
17. 1990 Va. Acts 360 (codified at VA. CODE ANN. §§ 55-34.1 .19 (Cum. Supp. 1990)).
18. The other enacting jurisdictions are Hawaii, Idaho, Missouri, and Rhode Island. UNIF.
CUSTODIAL TRUST AcT, 7A U.L.A. 6, table of jurisdictions (Cum. Supp. 1990).
19. UNIF. CUSTODIAL TRUST AcT Commissioner's Prefatory Note, 7A U.L.A. 6.
20. Id.
21. For a Virginia analysis and discussion of UCTA, see Mezzullo, Roach, The Uniform
Custodial Trust Act: An Alternative to Adult Guardianship, 24 U. Ricm. L. REv. 65 (1989);
for a more general, national discussion, see Wade, Uniform Custodial Trust Act, PROB. &
PROP. 37 (1987). Those wishing a complete and authoritative explanation of UCTA may
write the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws, 676 N. St. Clair
St., Chicago, IL 60611, for a copy of the Act, which contains a prefatory note and the official
comments to each of its sections, explaining their operation.
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pacitated beneficiary may similarly terminate the custodial trust in
this manner but only if granted the power by the circuit court that
appointed him in a proceeding in which the custodial trustee is
made a party.22 If not previously terminated, the custodial trust ter-
minates on the death of the beneficiary. A transferor may not termi-
nate a custodial trust except as provided in this subsection.2 3
2. Section 5, subsection (a)'s bracketed amount of "[$20,000]" is
changed to "1$10,000.' 24
3. Section 7, subsection (b)'s definition of the standard of care as
that observed by a prudent person dealing with "property of an-
other" is changed to "such person's own property. 2 5
4. Section 8, subsection (a)'s grant of fiduciary powers to the cus-
todial trustee is expanded by adding the language "which shall in-
clude but not be limited to those powers set forth in § 64.1-57 as of
the date the custodian acts. '26
5. Section 18, subsection (a) is amended by adding a final sen-
tence reading "Either form may be modified by the owner to in-
clude, for example, a designation of an alternate or successor trus-
tee or the recipient of the custodial property upon termination of
the trust. 2 7
6. Sections 20 (Uniformity of Application and Construction), 21
(Short Title), 22 (Severability) and 23 (Effective Date) were not
enacted.
22. VA. CODE ANN. § 55-34.2(D) (Cum. Supp. 1990) (paralleling the requirements for a
guardian to revoke a durable power of appointment). See VA. CODE ANN. § 11-9.1 (Repl. Vol.
1989).
23. Id. § 55-34.2(D) (Cum. Supp. 1990).
24. Id. § 55-34.5. This corresponds to the amount in the parallel provisions of Virginia's
version of the Uniform Transfers to Minors Act. See VA. CODE ANN. §§ 31-42, -43 (Cum.
Supp. 1990).
25. Id. § 55-34.7 (corresponding to the general statement of the Virginia prudent man
rule found in VA. CODE ANN. § 26-45 (Repl. Vol. 1985), and the specific statement of the rule
contained in the parallel section of the Virginia version of the Uniform Transfers to Minors
Act, found at VA. CODE ANN. § 31-48(B) (Cum. Supp. 1990)).
26. Id. § 55-34.8 (paralleling the corresponding provision of the Virginia version of the
Uniform Transfers to Minors Act). See id. § 31-49.
27. Id. § 55-34.18(A).
[Vol. 24:827
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F. Spendthrift Trusts
1. Governmental Rights
The general rule that spendthrift trusts are immune from the
claims of a beneficiary's creditors is subject to various public policy
exceptions in favor of particular classes of claimants in a number
of jurisdictions.2" Virginia's spendthrift trust statute, section 55-19,
was amended to recognize one of these classes by providing, with
one exception,29 that "no such trust condition shall operate to the
prejudice of the United States or this Commonwealth or any
county, city or town."30
2. Settlor's Creditors
Section 55-19 was also amended to codify the general rule that,
although one might create a trust for himself, anyspendthrift pro-
vision in such a trust is "invalid against creditors and transferees
of the creator."' l Following the general American rule,3 2 the
amended section expressly provides that creditors and transferees
may reach any amounts which (i) are required to be or, (ii) in the
exercise of the trustee's discretion might be, paid to or for the ben-
efit of the creator.3
28. The most widely recognized exceptions are in favor of claims:
(a) by the wife or child of the beneficiary for support, or by the wife for alimony; (b)
for necessary services rendered to the beneficiary or necessary supplies rendered to
him; (c) for services rendered and materials furnished which preserve or benefit the
interest of the beneficiary; [and] (d) by the United States or a State to satisfy a claim
against the beneficiary.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 157 (1959).
29. The exception, which relates to governmental claims against disabled persons, is dis-
cussed infra notes 34-38 and accompanying text.
30. VA. CODE ANN. § 55-19(B) (Cum. Supp. 1990). The new rule is applicable to "any
claim first accruing after the effective date of the 1990 amendments to this section." Id.
This bill was passed as emergency legislation, and thus it became effective on April 18, 1990,
the date it was signed by the Governor. See 1990 Va. Acts 1759 (codified at VA. CODE ANN.
55-19 (Cum. Supp. 1990)).
31. VA. CODE ANN. § 55-19(C) (Cum. Supp. 1990). In this connection it is further provided
that "[w]hen a trust is funded by amounts attributable to any claim possessed by a benefi-
ciary, whether paid pursuant to a structured settlement or otherwise, the beneficiary shall
be considered a creator of the trust to the extent so funded." Id.
32. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 156 (1959).
33. If the trust has been funded by the creator and another, the amounts reachable by the
creator's creditors "shall not exceed the amount of the creator's proportionate contribution
to the trust." VA. CODE ANN. § 55-19(C).
1990]
UNIVERSITY OF RICHMOND LAW REVIEW
3. Public Assistance-Disabled Beneficiaries
Section 55-19 was further amended to provide a mechanism for
the Commonwealth's recovery of public assistance furnished to a
trust beneficiary if the beneficiary is liable for reimbursement
under state or federal law. However, it expressly provides that no
order shall be made pursuant to this mechanism "if the beneficiary
is an individual who has a medically determined physical or
mental disability that substantially impairs his ability to provide
for this care or custody and constitutes a substantial handicap. ' 4
In addition, section 37.1-110, dealing with the liability of a patient
in a state institution for payment of his expenses, was amended to
provide that "principal or income or both from a trust created for
the benefit of the patient shall be liable for payment only as pro-
vided in section 55-19." 85 Finally, section 55-19.1, which was en-
acted to enable the Commonwealth to seek reformation of a discre-
tionary trust in order to recover public assistance benefits paid to a
beneficiary," was repealed.37 These changes will enable one to cre-
ate a discretionary/spendthrift trust for another who fits within
the definition of "disabled" which (i) if it is a true discretionary
trust,3 will not prevent the beneficiary from qualifying for federal
programs such as Medicaid or Supplemental Security Income, and
which (ii) as it is a spendthrift trust, will be immune from the
reach of creditors, including claims by the Commonwealth for re-
imbursement of any form of public assistance benefits.
G. Trustee's Authority to Divide Trusts
Section 55-19.3 was enacted in 1988 se to enable a circuit court to
divide a trust into two or more separate trusts in order to obtain
34. VA. CODE ANN. § 55-19(D)(1) (Cum. Supp. 1990). Similar provisions are found in CAL.
PROB. CODE § 15306(b) (West Supp. 1990), and in Wisc. STAT. ANN. § 701.06(5m) (West 1981
& Cum. Supp. 1989).
35. VA. CODE ANN. § 37.1-110 (Cure. Supp. 1990).
36. 1981 Va. Acts 836 (codified at VA. CODE ANN. § 55-19.1 (Repl. Vol: 1986)).
37. 1990 Va. Acts 1759 (effective Apr. 18, 1990).
38. In this connection, the amendment further provides that:
(a) duty in the trustee under the instrument to make disbursements in a manner or
in amounts that do not cause the beneficiary to suffer a loss of eligibility for public
assistance to which the beneficiary might otherwise be entitled shall not be consid-
ered a right possessed by the beneficiary to compel such payments.
VA. CODE ANN. § 55-19(D)(1) (Cum. Supp. 1990).
39. VA. CODE ANN. § 55-19.3 (Cum. Supp. 1990).
832 [Vol. 24:827
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certain tax benefits.40 The 1990 amendments eliminate the need
for judicial action by authorizing a trustee to make a unilateral di-
vision, in the absence of a specific contrary provision in a trust, "if
the trustee in his discretion determines that such division will not
defeat or materially impair (i) the accomplishment of the trust
purposes or (ii) the interests of any beneficiary."41
In those cases where the governing document fails to confer such
a power, this amendment will enable a trustee, without court ap-
proval; (i) to segregate the qualified and the nonqualified portions
of a QTIP trust into separate trusts when a partial election is
made under Internal Revenue Code ("I.R.C.") section 2056(b)(7);
(ii) to avoid a trust that would have a fractional inclusion ratio for
Generation-Skipping tax purposes, under I.R.C section 2642, by di-
viding the property into two trusts (prior to the executor's alloca-
tion) with inclusion ratios of 1, and 0, respectively; and (iii) to ob-
tain a number of single beneficiary trusts, each of which would
meet the shareholder requirements of a Subchapter S "small busi-
ness corporation" by virtue of I.R.C. section 1361(c)(2)(A)(i). The
1990 amendment, which is expressly made applicable to trusts
without regard to when the trustee was qualified or appointed, was
designated as "declaratory of existing law. "42
H. Disclaimers-Guardian for Ward'
Section 37.1-142 was amended in 198443 to enable the circuit
court, upon petition of a ward's fiduciary, to direct the fiduciary to
make gifts from income and principal, not necessary for the ward's
maintenance, to those persons to whom the ward would, in the
court's judgment, have made such gifts if the ward were of sound
mind. The process requires that a guardian ad litem be appointed
for the ward, that reasonable notice be given to the ward and par-
ties who would be affected by the proposed gifts, and that due con-
sideration be given by the court to a number of factors.44
40. These benefits and the operation of the 1988 statute are discussed in Johnson, Wills,
Trusts, and Estates: Annual Survey of Virginia Law, 22 U. RicH. L. REv. 759, 766 (1988).
41. VA. CODE ANN. § 55-19.3.
42. Id.
43. 1984 Va. Acts 1148 (codified at VA. CODE ANN. § 37.1-142 (Cum. Supp. 1990)).
44. These factors are:
(i) the size and composition of the ward's estate, (ii) the nature and probable dura-
tion of the ward's incapacity, (iii) the effect of such gifts on the estate's financial
ability to meet the ward's foreseeable maintenance needs, (iv) the ward's estate plan,
(v) prior patterns of assistance or gifts to the proposed donees, (vi) the tax effect of
1990]
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The 1990 amendment to section 37.1-142 provides that the cir-
cuit court may direct a guardian of a ward's estate to disclaim
property on behalf of the ward under the same circumstances that
the court may now direct a guardian to make a gift of property.45
The 1990 amendment was passed as emergency legislation, with an
effective date of April 2, 1990, and was designated as "declaratory
of existing law." 4
6
I. Disclaimer of Present Interest as Disclaimer of Future
Interest
Section 64.1-190 and section 64.1-193, enacted as a part of Vir-
ginia's Disclaimer Act in 1972,11 have both provided that "(a) per-
son who has a present and a future interest in property and dis-
claims his present interest in whole or in part, shall be deemed to
have disclaimed his future interest to the same extent. '48 "Thus,
under a trust to pay the income to A with the principal distributa-
ble to him at age 40, if A disclaims his income interest only, he will
also be deemed to have disclaimed his future interest in the
principal. 49
The 1990 amendment will limit the application of this rule to
those instances where "such disclaimer of a present interest would
cause the future interest to become a present interest. ' 50 The pri-
mary purpose of this amendment is to facilitate the salvage of the
marital deduction for trusts which fail to qualify therefor under
I.R.C. section 2056(b)(7) because of income interests in favor of
persons other than the surviving spouse, usually the decedent's
children. Absent the amendment, the children (who typically are
also the remaindermen of the trust) would be reluctant to disclaim
their income interest because they would also thereby lose their
remainder interest in the trust. The 1990 amendment was passed
the proposed gifts, and (vii) such other factors as the court may deem relevant.
VA. CODE ANN. § 37.1-142(B) (Cum. Supp. 1990).
45. Id. § 37.1-142.
46. 1990 Va. Acts 591 (codified at VA. CODE ANN. 37.1-142 (Cum. Supp. 1990)).
47. VA. CODE ANN. § 64.1-188 to -196 (Repl. Vol. 1987).
48. Id. §§ 64.1-190, -193.
49. Disclaimer of Testamentary and Non-Testamentary Dispositions-Suggestions for a
Model Act, 3 REAL PaoP. PROB. & TR. J. 131, 137 (1968). Although there is no official statu-
tory history for the Virginia Disclaimer Act, a comparison of it and the suggested Model Act
leads one to the conclusion that the Model Act is the obvious source of the Virginia
legislation.
50. VA. CODE ANN. §§ 64.1-190, -193 (Cum. Supp. 1990).
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as emergency legislation, with an effective date of April 2, 1990,
and was designated as "declaratory of existing law.'
5 1
J. Disclaimers-Survivorship and Entirety Property
Section 64.1-191, dealing with the right to disclaim succession to
property passing under nontestamentary instruments, is amended
to provide that "[a] surviving joint tenant or tenant by the entirety
may disclaim as a separate interest any property or interest therein
devolving to him by right of survivorship." 52 This legislation, which
provides that the amendment is "declaratory of existing law," 3
eliminates any uncertainty that might have existed concerning dis-
claimer of survivorship interests in Virginia due to the silence of
the Virginia Disclaimer Act on this point.
Although the Internal Revenue Service's initial position was to
the contrary, there is no longer a problem in obtaining federal rec-
ognition of a disclaimer of this accretive portion of a joint tenancy
by a surviving joint tenant even though the survivor disclaims
more than nine months after the creation of the tenancy, so long as
the disclaimer is made within nine months after the first tenant's
death.54 However, as the present law appears to be premised upon
a "partitionable" interest in the tenants during their lifetime, it
seems unlikely that similar federal recognition will be extended to
a disclaimer of the accretive portion of a tenancy by the entirety.5
The 1990 amendment to section 64.1-191 further establishes
that:
[a] surviving joint tenant or tenant by the entirety may disclaim the
entire interest in any property or interest therein that is the subject
of a joint tenancy or tenancy by the entirety devolving to him, if the
joint tenancy was created by the act of a deceased joint tenant or
tenant by the entirety and if the survivor did not join in creating the
joint tenancy or tenancy by the entirety.5 6
51. 1990 Va. Acts 591 (codified at VA. CODE ANN. 64.1-193 (Cum. Supp. 1990)).
52. VA. CODE ANN. § 64.1-191 (Cum. Supp. 1990).
53. 1990 VA. AcTs 591 (codified at VA. CODE ANN. 64.1-191 (Cum. Supp. 1990).
54. Estate of Dancy v. Commissioner, 872 F.2d 84 (4th Cir. 1989); McDonald v. Commis-
sioner, 56 T.C.M. 1598 (1989), acq. in result 1990-06 (Feb. 17, 1990).
55. Nevertheless, one recent writer has suggested that this is a possibility. See Mills, To
Disclaim or Not to Disclaim: Disclaimers of Survivorship Interests in Jointly-Held
Spousal and Tenancy by the Entirety Property in Virginia, 7 Ta. & EsT. NEWSL. No. 2, at 1
(Va. St. B., Spring 1990).
56. VA. CODE ANN. § 64.1-191. This language was taken from the UNIFORM DISCLAIMER OF
1990]
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Notwithstanding any doubts that may exist in the federal tax area,
it is clear that for state law purposes this legislation will not only
allow (i) a disclaimer of the accretive half by a surviving tenant by
the entirety as well as by a surviving joint tenant, but also (ii) a
disclaimer of the entire interest in both tenancies if the survivor
did not join in its creation. One obvious area of utility will be in
creditors' rights cases when the choice is presented of accepting
property with the knowledge that it will be lost to creditors, or
disclaiming the property (or the accretive portion) so that it might
pass instead to others. The 1990 amendment was passed as emer-
gency legislation, with an effective date of April 2, 1990, and was
designated as "declaratory of existing law."57
K. Power of Attorney in Fact to Sell Stock
Section 13.1-425(d), a part of Virginia's Uniform Act for the
Simplification of Fiduciary Security Transfers, s was amended to
include within the definition of "fiduciary" an "attorney-in-fact
pursuant to a power of attorney which authorizes the attorney-in-
fact to sell the personal property of the principal."'5 9 This amend-
ment was designed to facilitate the transfer of corporate stock by
an agent pursuant to a power of attorney. Corporations and trans-
fer agents dealing with an agent under a power of attorney will
now be able to obtain the same degree of protection as they pres-
ently have when dealing with a personal representative or
trustee."
L. Health Care Power of Attorney-Physician's Duty of Inquiry
Section 37.1-134.4 was added to the Code in 1989 to provide ad-
ditional procedures for surrogate treatment decision making on be-
half of adult persons who, due to illness or injury which precludes
communication or impairs judgment, are unable to make informed
medical decisions.6 The 1990 amendment eliminates from this sec-
TRANSFERS UNDER NONTESTAMENTARY INSTRUMENTS ACT § 1, 8A U.L.A. 112 (1983).
57. See 1990 Va. Acts 591.
58. VA. CODE ANN. §§ 13.1-424 to -433 (Repl. Vol. 1989)
59. Id. § 13.1-425(d) (Cum. Supp. 1990).
60. "A corporation or transfer agent incurs no liability to any person by making a transfer
or otherwise acting in a manner authorized by this chapter." Id. § 13.1-430 (Repl. Vol.
1989).
61. VA. CODE ANN. § 37.1-134.4 (Cum. Supp. 1990); see Johnson, Wills, Trusts, and Es-
tates: Annual Survey of Virginia Law, 23 U. RiCH. L. REv. 859, 862-63 (1989).
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tion the following language:
In cases where the physician intends to rely upon the authority ap-
parently conferred by a durable power of attorney, he shall use rea-
sonable efforts to contact the patient's next-of-kin, if known, for the
purpose of ascertaining whether there is any ground for questioning
the authority apparently conferred by the durable power of
attorney. 2
M. Self-Proved Wills
Sections 64.1-87.1 and -87.2 were amended to permit the requi-
site acts for making a will self-proving to also be accomplished
before "an officer of the foreign service of the United States, a con-
sular agent, or any other person authorized by regulation of the
United States Department of State to perform notarial acts in the
place in which the act is performed. '6 3
N. Statutory Boilerplate -Environmental Concerns-
Resignation
Section 64.1-57, authorizing the incorporation by reference of
certain powers of fiduciaries into a will or trust instrument, was
amended by adding to section (1) a new subsection (t). This new
subsection provides for extensive powers relating to environmental
concerns.
64
62. VA. CODE ANN. § 37.1-134.4(B).
63. VA. CODE ANN. §§ 64.1-87.1, -87.2 (Cum. Supp. 1990).
64. (t) To comply with environmental law:
1. To inspect property held by the fiduciary, including interest in sole proprietor-
ships, partnerships, or corporations and any assets owned by any such business enter-
prise, for the purpose of determining compliance with environmental law affecting
such property and to respond to a change in, or any actual or threatened violation of,
any environmental law affecting property held by the fiduciary;
2. To take, on behalf of the estate or trust, any action necessary to respond to a
change in, or prevent, abate, or otherwise remedy any actual or threatened violation
of, any environmental law affecting property held by the fiduciary, either before or
after the initiation of an enforcement action by any governmental body;
3. To refuse to accept property in trust if the fiduciary determines that any property
to be transferred to the trust either is contaminated by any hazardous substance or is
being used or has been used for any activity directly or indirectly involving any haz-
ardous substance which could result in liability to the trust or otherwise impair the
value of the assets held therein;
4. To disclaim any power granted by any document, statute, or rule of law which, in
the sole discretion of the fiduciary, may cause the fiduciary to incur personal liability
1990]
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Section 64.1-57 was further amended by adding to section (1), a
new subsection (u) as follows:
To resign as a fiduciary if the fiduciary reasonably believes that
there is or may be a conflict of interest between it in its fiduciary
capacity and in its individual capacity because of potential claims or
liabilities which may be asserted against it on behalf of the trust or
estate because of the type or condition of assets held therein. 5
0. Payments to the IRS by Wire Transfer- Voucher for
Accountings
Personal representatives and testamentary trustees are required
to make annual accountings before the commissioner of accounts
in which each disbursement must be supported by a "voucher. '66
New section 26-17.1 provides that "[i]n the case of payments to
the Internal Revenue Service for income tax estimates or any other
payments required or permitted to be made by wire transfer or
similar mechanism, the fiduciary shall not be required to exhibit a
receipt for such payment. ' 67 For purposes of accounting to the
commissioner of accounts, it is further provided that "[a] record or
statement of the bank making such payment shall be a sufficient
voucher. 68
under any environmental law;
5. For purposes of this subdivision, "environmental law" means any federal, state, or
local law, rule, regulation, or ordinance relating to protection of the environment or
human health and 'hazardous substances' means any substances defined as hazardous
or toxic or otherwise regulated by any environmental law. The fiduciary shall be enti-
tled to charge the cost of any inspection, review, abatement, response, cleanup, or
remedial action authorized herein against the income or principal of the trust or es-
tate. A fiduciary shall not be personally liable to any beneficiary or other party for
any decrease in value of assets in trust or in an estate by reason of the fiduciary's
compliance with any environmental law, specifically including any reporting require-
ment under such law. Neither the acceptance by the fiduciary of property or a failure
by the fiduciary to inspect property shall be deemed to create any inference as to
whether or not there is or may be any liability under any environmental law with
respect to such property.
VA. CODE ANN. § 64.1-57(1)(t) (Cum. Supp. 1990).
65. Id. § 64.1-57(1)(u).
66. VA. CODE ANN. § 26-17 (Repl. Vol. 1985).
67. Id. § 26-17.1 (Cum. Supp. 1990).
68. Id,
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P. Direct Payments to Beneficiary's Account-Voucher for
Accountings
New section 26-17.2 provides that "[a] fiduciary may make pay-
ment to a beneficiary by transfer to his bank account with the fi-
duciary or by payment to an account with another bank through
an automated clearinghouse, wire transfer or similar mechanism if
the beneficiary has consented in writing to such method of pay-
ment. ' 69 For purposes of accounting to the commissioner of ac-
counts, it is further provided that "[a] record or statement of the
bank making the payment shall be a sufficient voucher."70
Q. Virginia Estate Tax-Payment Extension-Federal
Conformity
Section 58.1-905 was amended to provide that if a personal rep-
resentative has obtained an extension of time for paying the fed-
eral estate tax, or any portion thereof, the payment of any Virginia
estate tax will be extended for the same period. Upon receiving a
federal extension the personal representative must provide the De-
partment of Taxation with a true copy thereof. Notwithstanding
the extension, interest pursuant to section 58.1-15 is added for the
period past the normal due date.71
R. Investment in Fiduciary's Affiliated Mutual Fund
New section 26-44.1 provides that, absent language to the con-
trary in the governing instrument, a fiduciary may invest in an af-
filiated mutual fund, if the investment is otherwise appropriate.
However, such a fiduciary is not entitled to a commission as fiduci-
ary to the extent it or its affiliates receive compensation for ser-
vices to the affiliated fund unless otherwise expressly agreed to in
writing by the creator of the trust or affected beneficiary. 2
69. VA. CODE ANN. § 26-17.2 (Cumi. Supp. 1990).
70. Id.
71. VA. CODE ANN. § 58.1-905 (CUr. Supp. 1990).
72. VA. CODE ANN. § 26-44.1 (Cur. Supp. 1990).
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II. 1989-90 JUDICIAL DECISIONS
A. Rule Against Perpetuities-Application-Retroactivity
The first issue in Lake of the Woods Association v. McHugh7 3
was whether the rule against perpetuities applies to a right of first
refusal.74 The Supreme Court of Virginia answered this question of
first impression in the affirmative, based upon a determination
that such a right is an interest in property and that this particular
right was of unlimited duration.7 5 The other issue was whether the
retroactive application of a 1982 statute to a 1975 transaction
would be constitutional. In 1982 the General Assembly replaced
the "might have been" aspect of the common law rule against per-
petuities with a statutory combination of "wait and see" and cy
pres.6 In addition, it was expressly provided that the new law
would apply "to all interests heretofore created except insofar as
any conveyance or distribution of the affected property has been
made, or any detrimental action has been taken, in reliance on the
common law rule against perpetuities. '7 7 Noting that the right of
first refusal in McHugh was void at the time of its creation under
the then existing rule against perpetuities, the court concluded
that it was "unwilling to agree to a rule that would permit the de-
struction of vested or substantive rights by retroactive application
of legislation. "78
73. 238 Va. 1, 380 S.E.2d 872 (1989). This case was combined with James v. Burt (Record
No. 870694) which raised the same issues.
74. The provision before the court provided that:
[w]henever the owner of any lot... shall receive a bona fide offer to purchase said
lot, which offer is acceptable to said owner,. . . said owner shall offer to sell said lot,
at the price and on the same terms contained in said bona fide offer ... first to the
owner of the lot on the right of the prospective seller's lot, next to the owner of the
lot on the left of the prospective seller's lot, and finally, to the [corporation develop-
ing the subdivision], its successors or assigns.
238 Va. at 3, 380 S.E.2d at 872-73.
75. Id. at 7, 380 S.E.2d at 874-75.
76. 1982 Va. Acts 399 (codified at VA. CODE ANN. § 55-13.3 (Repl. Vol. 1986)). This legisla-
tion, based on RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF PROPERTY (Tentative Draft No. 2, §§ 1.4 -.6,
March 15, 1979), is discussed briefly in Johnson, Transformation of the Rule Against Per-
petuities in Virginia, U. RiCH. LAW SCH. NEWSL. at 10 (Oct. 1982).
77. VA. CODE ANN. § 55-13.3(D) (Repl. Vol. 1986).
78. 238 Va. at 9, 380 S.E.2d at 876. The opinion refers to the fact that two of the approxi-
mately fifteen jurisdictions that have adopted the "wait and see" rule have specifically pro-
vided for its retroactive application, and that this retroactivity has been upheld in both
instances. For an excellent discussion of this issue, and retroactivity of probate legislation in
general, see Levin, Section 6104(d) of the Pennsylvania Rule Against Perpetuities: The
Validity and Effect of the Retroactive Application of Property and Probate Law Reform,
25 ViLL. L. REV. 213 (1980).
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B. Undue Influence- Commissioner's Ruling Presumptively
Correct
The sole issue in Jarvis v. Tonkin,79 was whether testatrix' will
was procured by undue influence.8 0 On this issue the commissioner
in chancery, to whom the case was referred by the trial court, re-
ported that plaintiffs had failed to carry their burden of proof.8 '
However, the chancellor sustained exceptions to the commis-
sioner's report and ruled that the will had been procured by undue
influence. Nevertheless the supreme court ruled that testatrix' will
was not the product of undue influence, and "[b]ecause the com-
missioner's report was supported by the evidence, the chancellor
erred in setting it aside. '8 2
C. Legal Malpractice-Beneficiaries v. Testators' Attorneys
The dispositive issue in Copenhaver v. Rogers, 3 was whether
plaintiffs "made sufficient allegations of legal malpractice against
their grandparents' lawyers to survive challenge by demurrer." s4
The trial court's ruling that there was no cause of action in tort,
due to a lack of privity, was affirmed. 5 In order to reach the ques-
tion of plaintiffs' cause of action in contract as third party benefi-
ciaries, the court first "assume[d] without deciding that Code § 55-
22 applies to oral contracts." ' Although plaintiffs' pleadings al-
79. 238 Va. 115, 380 S.E.2d 900 (1989).
80. "Before a will may be set aside on the ground of undue influence, that influence 'must
be sufficient to destroy free agency on the part of the ... testator.'. . . It must be of such
character as to control the testator's mind and actions. It must amount to coercion or du-
ress." Id. at 120, 380 S.E.2d at 903 (quoting Wood v. Wood, 109 Va. 470, 472, 63 S.E. 994,
995 (1909)) (citation omitted).
81. The commissioner in chancery "heard the testimony of numerous witnesses, read dep-
ositions, and examined the exhibits." Id. at 119, 380 S.E.2d at 903 (1989).
82. Id. at 122, 380 S.E.2d at 904. "While the report of a commissioner in chancery does
not carry the weight of a jury verdict, Code § 8.01-610, it should be sustained unless the
trial court concludes that the commissioner's findings are not supported by the evidence."
Id. at 1221, 380 S.E. at 904 (quoting Morris v. United Virginia Bank, 237 Va. 331, 337, 377
S.E.2d 611, 614 (1989)).
83. 238 Va. 361, 384 S.E.2d 593 (1989).
84. Id. at 363, 384 S.E.2d at 593.
85. This is not a case involving personal injury or property damage, areas in which the
common-law privity rules have been modified by statute. See, e.g., Code §§ 8.01-223
and § 8.2-318. Instead, this is a case involving a claim solely for economic losses. It is
settled in the Commonwealth that no cause of action exists in such cases absent priv-
ity of contract.
Id. at 366, 384 S.E.2d at 595.
86. Id. at 367, 384 S.E.2d at 596. VA. CODE ANN. § 55-22 (Repl. Vol. 1986), Virginia's third
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leged that "'defendants owed plaintiffs, as intended third-party
beneficiaries of the estate of [the grandparents] or otherwise, a
duty of reasonable care;' "87 [the plaintiff's] "never alleged that
their grandparents and [the grandparents' attorney] entered a con-
tract of which they were intended beneficiaries. Thus, the motion
for judgment utterly fails to allege a third-party beneficiary con-
tract claim."88 This case is the subject of an article found in an
earlier issue of this review. 9
D. Will Construction- Vesting-Defeasance
In Clark v. Strother,9 Item 2 of testator's will devised property
to his son, Charley, "to have and to hold during his life and to be
left to his children under the same conditions as those specified in
Item 1."91 This reference to Item 1 incorporated into Item 2 the
condition that "if Charley 'leave' no child, then the property shall
go to his brother or sister or to their children."92 Testator was sur-
vived by Charley and Charley's only child, Edith. At Charley's sub-
sequent death, his only surviving descendant was Edith's son
(Charley's grandson), William. The court "accord[ed] the verb
'leave' its commonly accepted meaning: 'to have remaining after
one's death or extinction,' 93 and concluded that Charley did not
"leave" a child. Accordingly, the court held that the remainder
"vested at the time of the testator's death in any child or children
of Charley, subject to being divested out of each vested remainder-
man by his or her death before the life tenant and vested in the
testator's other child or children. 94
party beneficiary statute, refers to claims of such persons under an "instrument," thus leav-
ing its applicability to oral contracts in doubt.
87. 238 Va. at 368, 384 S.E.2d at 596.
88. Id. at 369, 384 S.E.2d at 597 (footnote omitted). The court further noted that "[t]here
is a critical difference between being the intended beneficiary of an estate and being the
intended beneficiary of a contract between a lawyer and his client." Id. at 368, 384 S.E.2d at
596.
89. Note, Whose Beneficiaries are They Anyway? Copenhaver v. Rogers and the Attor-
ney's Contract to Prepare a Will in Virginia, 24 U. RICH. L. REv. 415 (1990).
90. 238 Va. 533, 385 S.E.2d 578 (1989).
91. Id. at 536, 385 S.E.2d at 579.
92. Id. at 540, 385 S.E.2d at 582.
93. Id. at 541, 385 S.E.2d at 582 (quoting WEBSTER's THIRD NEw INTERNATIONAL DICTION-
ARY 1287 (1981)).
94. 238 Va. at 541, 385 S.E.2d at 582 (1989). As the facts of the case indicate that the
testator's other children predeceased both Charley and Edith, the court may have meant to
refer to testator's "grandchildren."
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E. Inter Vivos Trusts-Right to Accounting
In Shriners Hospitals v. Smith,9 5 the sole issue was "whether a
vested remainderman has the right to an accounting from the trus-
tee [of an inter vivos trust] when the terms of the trust do not
specifically provide for such an accounting." ' 6 Noting that prior
case law has established that a current beneficiary is entitled to an
accounting, and that a vested remainderman has a present interest,
the court stated that "such a present right supports a present in-
terest in the administration of the trust assets. '97 Accordingly, the
court held that "under general equity principles, a vested remain-
derman has the right to an accounting from the trustee, even
though the terms of the trust do not provide for such an
accounting."98
F. Holographic Will-Signature
The issue in Slate v. Titmus 9 was whether a holographic writing
that had its author's name written in the opening paragraph, but
not anywhere else, met the execution requirements of a ho-
lographic will.100 Although the Virginia statute does not provide a
specific place for a testator's signature, it does require that "[n]o
will shall be valid unless it be . . .signed by the testator . . . in
such manner as.to make it manifest that the name is intended as a
signature."''1 1 By a five to two decision, the court held that "[f]rom
a reading of the instrument as a whole, and paying particular at-
tention to the phrase, 'Given under my hand,' 102 we conclude that
95. 238 Va. 708, 385 S.E.2d 617 (1989).
96. Id. at 709, 385 S.E.2d at 617.
97. Id. at 710, 385 S.E.2d at 618.
98. Id. at 711, 385 S.E.2d at 619.
99. 238 Va. 557, 385 S.E.2d 590 (1989).
100. This entire writing read as follows:
I, Garland B. Slate, Route 3-Box 456 Petersburg, Va., do hereby declare this to be my
last will and testament.
I. I give and devise and bequeath to Edward B. Titmus all of my estate, both real
and personal where ever situated.
II. I appoint Edward B. Titmus the executor of this my last will and testament,
and desire that no security be required of him as such.
Given under my hand this 25th day of October 1986.
Id. at 558-59, 385 S.E.2d at 591.
101. VA. CODE ANN. § 64.1-49 (Repl. Vol. 1987).
102. The court had earlier noted that "[o]ne definition of 'hand' is '[a] person's signature.'
Moreover, the phrase, 'under the hand of,' means authenticated by the. . . signature of.'"
Slate, 238 at 561, 385 S.E.2d at 592 (quoting BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 644 (5th ed. 1979)
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Slate intended his name, as written in the exordium clause, to be
his signature to the Will."1103
G. Will Execution-Witness' Signature
In Robinson v. Ward,10 4 testatrix, shortly after becoming "ill
with 'a violent headache' . . . directed [Katherine D.] Ward to ob-
tain 'a legal pad.'. . . [And] '[w]rite exactly what I say, and do not
interrupt me.' ,1o05 The first sentence written by Ward, at testatrix'
dictation, was "'To Katherine D. Ward I leave everything I own
for her life time.' "106 Following the completion of the writing, tes-
tatrix "'read it over, signed her name, dated it [May 18, 1986],'
and 'handed it back' to Ward.' 1 07 Shortly thereafter, and while
Ward was present, testatrix informed a friend of the dictation of
her will and asked him to "'please read it and witness it-which
he did."'os
The question before the court was whether Ward's name, written
in her own hand in the opening sentence of the will, was sufficient
to satisfy the attestation requirement for a nonholographic will.' 09
On these facts the trial court had concluded that "'[t]he words
"Katherine D. Ward" written by her while not a signature when
made were sufficient subscription under the unique facts of this
case to constitute satisfactory compliance' with the statute in ques-
tion." 10 In a four to three decision, the supreme court agreed with
the trial court.
and WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 1026 (1981)).
103. Slate, 238 at 561, 385 S.E.2d at 592.
104. 239 Va. 36, 387 S.E.2d 735 (1990).
105. Id. at 39, 387 S.E.2d at 737.
106. Id.
107. Id.
108. Id.
109. VA. CODE ANN. § 64.1-49 (Rep. Vol. 1987) provides in part: "the [testator's] signature
shall be made or the will acknowledged by him in the presence of at least two competent
witnesses, present at the same time; and each such witness shall subscribe the will in the
presence of the testator, but no form of attestation shall be necessary." Although the statute
uses the word "subscribe" when referring to the act required of the witnesses, "the statute
mandates no specific form nor particular place on the document for the witness' signature."
Robinson, 239 Va. at 42, 387 S.E.2d at 738 (1990) (quoting Peake v. Jenkins, 80 Va. 293, 296
(1885)).
110. Robinson, 239 Va. at 41, 387 S.E.2d at 738.
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H. Gifts Subject to Invalid Limitations
In Heritage Methodist Homes of Virginia, Inc. v. Dominion
Trust Company,"' the following provision of testator's will was
before the court:
So long as Prince Edward School Foundation, Prince Edward Co.,
Va., admits to any school, operated or supported by it, only mem-
bers of the White Race ... my said Trustee shall pay the net in-
come. . . to the Trustees (or other governing body) of such Founda-
tion, to be expended by them ... for the benefit of any of said
schools." 2
This provision was followed by subsequent gifts over; (i) to a sec-
ond school if Prince Edward admitted a prohibited person; (ii) to a
third school if the second school admitted a prohibited person; (iii)
to a fourth school if the third school admitted a prohibited person;
and (iv) to Hermitage Methodist Homes (without any limitation) if
the fourth school admitted a prohibited person. At the outset the
court "assume[d], without deciding, that the trial court correctly
ruled that the racially discriminatory provisions are unconstitu-
tional and void.""'  However the court pointed out that testator
"repeatedly specified that each educational beneficiary's right to
receive income extended only 'so long as' the beneficiary complied
with the [void] restrictive provision."" 4 The court determined that
the "so long as" was a "special limitation"" 5 and, after examining
Virginia precedent, concluded that "[i]f a condition subsequent is
unlawful, a court can merely excise the offending language and
leave the remaining estate intact. But, where a gift or estate sub-
ject to a limitation is unlawful, in order to cure the defect the court
must terminate the entire gift or estate.""' 6 Thus the court con-
cluded it must strike the gifts to all of the educational beneficiaries
and, as the special limitation was not attached to the final gift
over, "Hermitage has the only valid, remaining interest.""1
7
111. 239 Va. 46, 387 S.E.2d 740 (1990) cert. denied, - U.S. - (Oct. 9, 1990). This case
was combined with Miller School of Albemarle County v. Dominion Trust Co. (Record No.
881354), and Seven Hills School Inc. v. Dominion Trust Co. (Record No. 881390), involving
the same parties and issues.
112. Id. at 49, 387 S.E.2d at 741-42.
113. Id. at 54-55, 387 S.E.2d at 744.
114. Id. at 56, 387 S.E.2d at 746.
115. Id. at 56, 387 S.E.2d at 745.
116. Id. at 57, 387 S.E.2d at 746.
117. Id. The court also held that the doctrine of cy pres, codified in VA. CODE ANN. § 55-
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I. Remainders- Vested or Contingent
In Landmark Communications, Inc. v. Sovran Bank,118 a testa-
mentary trust provided for termination upon the death of the last
life beneficiary, at which time remainder interests in the trust
would be payable to certain persons "or" their heirs. "If 'or' is
given its ordinary disjunctive meaning, the remainder interests
* .* are contingent and will not vest until the trust terminates. If
'or' is interpreted as conjunctive, the interests in the trust became
indefeasibly vested at the death of the testator.""' 9 The court con-
cluded that the will was unambiguous, that testator's intent could
be found within its four corners, and that testator's intent was to
use "or" in its ordinary disjunctive sense. 20
J. Testamentary Capacity-Burden and Standard of Proof
In Gibbs v. Gibbs, 2' the court found that a jury instruction
given by the trial court was "erroneous insofar as it placed the bur-
den of proof on contestants and required a showing of testamen-
tary incapacity by evidence which was clear and convincing.' 22 A
second instruction 2 s was found to have been properly refused by
the trial court because "[t]his instruction, which comments on the
evidence by reviewing a prior court order, implies to the jury that
the testatrix was prima facie incompetent when she -executed the
31 (Repl. Vol 1986), was not applicable because "there is no indefiniteness or uncertainty
regarding the beneficiaries or purpose of the trust. Moreover, there is a valid gift over to
Hermitage as we have said, and this eliminates any need for the court to search for the
testator's intent." Id. at 58, 387 S.E.2d at 747.
118. 239 Va. 158, 387 S.E.2d 484 (1990).
119. Id. at 163, 387 S.E.2d at 487.
120. Id. at 164, 387 S.E.2d at 487-88.
121. 239 Va. 197, 387 S.E.2d 499 (1990).
122. Id. at 201, 387 S.E.2d at 501.
123. While there is a presumption that every person is competent until such person has
been declared incompetent, the jury should consider in determining whether [testa-
trix] was competent to make a will on October 14, 1978 that pending at that time was
a proceeding in the Norfolk Circuit Court in which an order was entered February 2,
1979 declaring her incapacitated and appointing a guardian of her funds, along with
all of the other evidence introduced in the case, and determine from all of the evi-
dence whether [testatrix] on October 14, 1978 had testamentary capacity to execute a
will.
WILLS, TRUSTS, AND ESTATES
will because a competency hearing was pending at that time and a
guardian was ultimately appointed for her. 124
K. Wills-Interpretation
In Haag v. Stickley,2 5 a five to two decision of the court applied
settled principles of law in upholding the trial court's interpreta-
tion of a testamentary bequest of corporate stock.
L. Attorney Trustee-Professional Misconduct
In Gay v. Virginia State Bar,126 the court upheld a three year
suspension from the practice of law imposed upon an attorney be-
cause of his misconduct while serving as trustee for a client. 27 The
attorney argued that his actions in regard to the trust did not in-
volve the practice of law 28 and thus the Disciplinary Rules were
inapplicable in this case. The court rejected this contention, noting
that there had been an attorney client relationship at one time,
and "no evidence [existed] that the relationship was interrupted or
extinguished until 1986. Furthermore, Gay prepared legal instru-
ments such as deeds of trust and a consent to pledge personalty in
order to protect the funds in the trust account.1 29
M. Oral Trusts-Real Estate
In Gibbens v. Hardin,"10 the court again recognized that oral
trusts in real estate are allowed in Virginia,' 3' but concluded that
124. Id. at 202, 387 S.E.2d at 502. "Although evidence of such action is appropriate, it
must be left to the jury, not the trial court, to assign appropriate weight to that evidence."
Id.
125. 239 Va. 298, 389 S.E.2d 691 (1990).
126. 239 Va. 401, 389 S.E.2d 470 (1990).
127. Although the court refers to the mismanagement as involving a "client's" funds, or
otherwise relating to a "client," it appears that the funds belonged to the "client's" grand-
daughter. The second paragraph of the opinion reads in part as follows: "In June of 1983,
Gay was retained by Mary Lou Williams to recover insurance proceeds for the benefit of
Williams' granddaughter, a minor. Gay did so successfully, and Williams requested Gay to
invest the net proceeds of $29,099.64." Id. at 403, 389 S.E.2d at 471.
128. Id. at 405, 389 S.E.2d at 472. "Generally, the relation of attorney and client exists,
and one is deemed to be practicing law whenever he furnishes to another advice or service
under circumstances which apply [sic] his possession and use of legal knowledge or skill."
Id. (quoting VA. Sup. CT. 1R pt. 6, § I(B) (1990)).
129. Gay, 239 Va. at 405, 389 S.E.2d at 472.
130. 239 Va. 425, 389 S.E.2d 478 (1990).
131. "That an express trust in land may be set up by parol is perfectly well settled in this
State. . . . It is equally true, however, that in order to establish such a trust the declaration
1990]
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"[t]his record is utterly devoid of any evidence capable of estab-
lishing an express trust."'12
N. Intestate Succession-Illegitimates-Foreign Law
In Hupp v. Hupp,i3 3 Loy, an unmarried Pennsylvania resident,
died intestate owning an interest in Virginia real estate, which was
claimed by May and Lloyd as Loy's children. On June 24, 1953,
Loy had been convicted of the nonsupport of May and Lloyd by a
Pennsylvania court, and ordered to pay a weekly sum therefor. Loy
did not take an appeal in this case. 34 The Supreme Court of Vir-
ginia found that "[i]n Pennsylvania, an order for support of an ille-
gitimate child 'necessarily determines the issue of paternity.' .. .
'Absent any appeal, the issue of paternity is established as a mat-
ter of law.' ,1" The court also concluded that "[t]he United States
Constitution, as well as federal and state statutes, requires the
courts of this state to give full faith and credit to a judgment ren-
dered in another state, provided the foreign court had jurisdiction
over the parties and the subject matter."'36 Accordingly, the court
held that "the Pennsylvania adjudication of paternity has estab-
lished for Virginia intestate succession purposes the status of de-
fendants as children of decedent.' 113 7
0. Trustees' Attorney Fees-Recoverability from Trust
Wiglesworth v. Taylor 38 was a proceeding brought by a trustee
in bankruptcy to recover from the co-trustees of a testamentary
trust certain post-bankruptcy distributions made to the bankrupt.
After concluding that the co-trustees were liable for all distribu-
tions made to the bankrupt following notice of the bankruptcy
trustee's claim, the court next dealt with the co-trustees' right to
attorney fees incurred in defending this proceeding. Although rea-
must be unequivocal and explicit, and the evidence thereof must be clear and convincing."
Id. at 431, 389 S.E.2d at 481 (quoting Brame v. Read, 136 Va. 219, 221-22, 118 S.E. 117, 118
(1923)).
132. Gibbens, 239 Va. at 431, 389 S.E.2d at 481.
133. 239 Va. 494, 391 S.E.2d 329 (1990).
134. Id. at 496, 391 S.E.2d at 330.
135. Id. at 499, 391 S.E.2d at 332 (quoting Manze v. Manze, 523 A.2d 821, 824 (Pa. Super.
1987) (citations omitted)).
136. Hupp, 239 Va. at 499, 391 S.E.2d at 332 (citing U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 1; 28 U.S.C. §
1738 (1988); VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-389(B) (Repl. Vol. 1984)).
137. Hupp, 239 Va. at 500, 391 S.E.2d at 332.
138. 239 Va. 603, 391 S.E.2d 299 (1990).
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sonable legal fees expended in defending a trust are normally reim-
bursable, "a trustee should not receive such reimbursement when
he caused the litigation."139 The court held that the co-trustees
could not recover attorney fees from the trust in this case, because
the litigation was caused by the co-trustees' negligence in making
the post-bankruptcy distributions. Furthermore, the co-trustees
could not recover from the bankrupt personally.140 Lastly, the
court found no merit in the bankrupt's contention that he should
not have to repay the amount of the improper distributions to the
co-trustees because of his reliance on their "superior expertise"
and concluded that he "is liable for any money paid to him by
mutual mistake, even though both parties were negligent in failing
to ascertain whether these payments were proper." '
139. Id. at 609, 391 S.E.2d at 303. The court further quoted Professor Scott for the pro-
position that "[I]f the [co-trustees] negligently permitted a third person [Wiglesworth] to
obtain possession of the trust property, the expenses of the litigation that resulted must be
borne by the [co-trustees] personally." Id. at 609, 391 S.E.2d at 303-04 (quoting 3 A. Scorr,
THE LAW OF TRusTs § 245 (4th ed. 1988) (brackets in original)).
140. Wiglesworth, 239 Va. at 609, 391 S.E.2d at 304. "A litigant cannot be required to pay
another litigant's attorney's fees when they have hostile interests in the litigation ....
[B]ecause the co-trustees sought to place the burden of their improper payments upon
Wiglesworth personally, or upon his interest in the trust, Wiglesworth's and the co-trustee's
primary interests were hostile." Id. (citations omitted)
141. Id. at 610, 391 S.E.2d at 304.
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